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INTRODUCTION

The international community considers refugees "among the world's
most desperate people."' Scholars and human rights advocates estimate
that women and children make up the overwhelming majority of the
worldwide refugee population.2 However, the majority of successful asylum applicants in the United States are men.' The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee has acknowledged that:
[W]hile forcibly displaced men and boys also face protection
problems, women and girls can be exposed to particular protection
problems related to their gender, their cultural and socio-economic
position, and their legal status, which mean that they may be less
likely than men and boys to be able to exercise their rights.'
1. Gi. LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATE) KINDNss: REFUGEES AND
AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 To TI-E PRESENT, at xiii (1986).
2. See Deborah Anker et al., Women Whose Governments are Unable or Unwilling to

Provide Reasonable Protectionfrom Domestic Violence May Qualify as Refugees Under
Untied States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 712 (1997) (stating as many as eighty
percent of the twenty-seven million refugees worldwide are women and children); Nancy
Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
625, 625 n.1 (1993) (noting seventy-five percent of refugees and displaced persons are women and children).
3. Arthur C. Helton & Alison Nicoll, Female Genital Mutilation as Grounds for Asylum in the United States: The Recent Case of In Re Fauziya Kasinga and Prospectsfor More
Gender Sensitive Approaches, 28 CoLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 375, 375 (1997).
4. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCR Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls, at i (Jan. 2008).
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Gender-related abuses that men do not face, like genital mutilation,
sexual assault, and domestic violence, often force women to flee their
homelands because they are left with little recourse.' However, asylum
applicants in the United States asserting claims based on gender-related
violence, especially those asserting claims based on domestic violence,
have been largely unsuccessful under both the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the United States Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 6
Domestic violence is a worldwide epidemic.' Even though most societies criminalize domestic violence, "the reality is that violations against
women's rights are often sanctioned under the garb of cultural practices
and norms, or through misinterpretation of religious tenets."8 The
United Nations asserts, "[V]iolence against women is a manifestation of
historically unequal power relations between men and women."' The
United Nations more specifically condemns violence against women as
one of the "crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a
subordinate position compared with men." 10 Thus, violence against women is "neither random nor individual," rather it is "systematic and
group-based."" The United Nations Report on violence against women
in the family concluded:
[A]ny explanation [for domestic violence] must go beyond the individual characteristics of the man, the woman and the family and look
to the structure of relationships and the role of society underpinning
that structure. In the end analysis, it is perhaps best to conclude that

5. See Nicole LaViolette, Gender-Related Refugee Claims: Expanding the Scope of the
Canadian Guidelines, 19 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 169, 173 (2007) (listing several abuses inflicted only upon women because they are women).
6. Kelly, supra note 2, at 626-27 (relating until recently, claims by women refugees
have been mostly ignored).
7. See Purna Sen, Development Practiceand Violence Against Women, in VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 8 (Caroline Sweetman ed., 1998) ("Women across all regions, ages, religions, classes, and political affiliations are vulnerable to violence .... .").
8. Olalekan A. Uthman et al., Factors Associated with Attitudes Towards Intimate
Partner Violence Against Women: A Comparative Analysis of 17 Sub-Saharan Countries,
BMC INr'L HEALTH & HUM. RTs., July 20, 2009, http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/
pdf/1472-698x-9-14.pdf.
9. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission: Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the
United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (Nov. 22, 1994).
10. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Declaration].
11. CATHARINE
TIONAL DIALOGUEs

A. MACKINNON,
22 (2006).
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violence against wives is a function of the belief, fostered in all cultures, that men are superior and that the women they live with are
their possessions or chattels that they can treat as they wish and as
they consider appropriate.12
Even though the treatment of women in many societies clearly violates
international human rights standards, "persistent ambivalence" characterizes the U.S. position on domestic violence asylum claims and leads to
"contradictory measures at the administrative level and inconsistent" decisions in immigration courts across the country.13 Adjudicators are reluctant to grant asylum in cases where the alleged gender-related violence
appears similar to forms of gender-related violence that are pervasive in
the United States.1 4 The misconception that domestic violence is a private issue, unconnected to the political and social structures that serve to
perpetuate the subjugation of women, underlies these decisions." The
pervasiveness of this public/private dichotomy indicates that violence
against women is viewed as somehow "less severe and less deserving" of
government protection.16
Modern scholarship connects the stereotypes and misperceptions that
plague asylum claims involving gender-related persecution to the doctrine of coverture." This doctrine, which places the wife in a legally
subordinate position to her husband, has been an important background

12. Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror: UnderstandingDomestic Violence as Torture, in
(Rebecca
J. Cook ed., 1994) (quoting the U.N. Report).
13. Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution:Fear of Floodgates or
Call to (Principled)Action?, 14 VA. J. Soc. Poi'Y & L. 119, 123 (2007).
14. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 291, 296 (1994) (advocating for a torture
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PFRSPECTIVES 120

definition including domestic violence practices).
15. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEx DISCRIMINATION AND TIlE

LAw 239-41 (1989) (explaining how past and present "inadequacies in legal response" reflect "misconceptions" about nature of domestic violence including perpetuation of the

idea of domestic violence as a private issue); Copelon, supra note 14 ("[W]hen stripped of
privatization, sexism and sentimentality, private gender-based violence is no less grave
than other forms of inhumane and subordinating official violence that have been prohibited by treaty and customary law . . . .").

16. Copelon, supra note 12, at 116.
17. See generally Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of
Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593, 593 (1991) (analyzing the coverture doctrine's legacy in modern immigration law); Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refuge for
Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 665,667 (1998)
("By incorporating the doctrines of coverture and chastisement, immigration law has been
recognized to perpetuate the no longer viable assumption that a wife belongs to her
husband.").
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principle in U.S. immigration law.1" Additionally, courts hesitate to grant
the claims of women facing society-wide persecution due to fears of setting a precedent that will create far more claims from women across the
globe than the system could possibly accommodate.' 9 This argument is
particularly troublesome since "[c]oncern over the size of the group sharing the protected characteristic has generally not been a barrier for persons persecuted on account of their race or religion."20
Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act) to create a
uniform procedure to respond to the urgent needs of people who fear
persecution in their homelands. 2 1 However, there is inconsistent and
inefficient application of the law for domestic violence victims seeking
asylum protection under the Act because they do not fit neatly into one
of the five protected grounds established by the Act.2 2 Two recent nonprecedential immigration decisions, In re R-A- 23 and In re L-R-, 2' have
further complicated the framework for adjudicating domestic violence
asylum claims and have left domestic violence victims in the untenable
position of arguing semantics to establish their safety.
This Article explains why the current approach to adjudicating domestic violence asylum claims in the United States advances neither the national security interest nor the humanitarian policy of the country and
explains why this problem necessitates an immediate statutory solution.
To do so, Part II of this Article outlines the historical foundation of U.S.
asylum law and the current requirements for successful asylum claim
under the Refugee Act. Part III discusses the treacherous history of gender-related asylum claims in the United States. Part IV highlights two
preeminent non-precedential domestic violence asylum cases, In re R-Aand In re L-R-, and points out the dysfunctional state of the current
adjudication system. In conclusion, Part V urges the President and Con-

18. Calvo, supra note 17, at 595.
19. See Musalo, supra note 13, at 120 (identifying floodgate fear as a prime reason for
opposition to gender-based asylum).
20. Jenny-Brooke Condon, Comment, Asylum Law's Gender Paradox, 33 SETOiN
HALL L. REV. 207, 252 (2002).
21. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
22. See Laura S. Adams, Fleeing the Family: A Domestic Violence Victim's Particular
Social Group, 49 Lov. L. REv. 287, 291 (2003) (stating the majority of domestic violence
victims are unable to establish a refugee claim on the basis of race, religion, nationality, or
political opinion).
23. In re R-A-, 22 1.& N. Dec. 906 (BIA 2001).
24. See generally Amended Declaration of L-R- in Support of Application for Asylum (BIA Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/
20090716-asylum-support.pdf (redacted) (detailing L-R-'s persecution as a Mexican
citizen).
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gress to work in unison to pass the International Violence Against Women Act with an amendment to the Refugee Act that establishes statetolerated domestic violence as a ground for asylum in the United States.
II.

HISTORY OF ASYLuM LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

In order to appreciate the challenges domestic violence victims face
while seeking asylum in the United States and why a statutory solution to
the problem is necessary, scholars, practitioners, and advocates must fully
understand the history of U.S. asylum law. This Part discusses the evolution of U.S. asylum law from its origins in the United Nations to the codification of the current statutory framework in the Refugee Act of 1980.
A.

The Origin of Asylum Law in the United States

In 1945, the United States signed the United Nations Charter with
forty-nine other nations25 "[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion." 26 The Charter clearly indicates that member
nations must advance human rights and fundamental freedoms without
distinction for gender.2 7 In the wake of the humanitarian crisis of World
War II, the United Nations promulgated the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, which has served as the foundation of international refugee law. 28 The 1951 Convention provided one of the first official definitions of a "refugee":
[A]ny person who ... [als a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owning to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
25. History of the United Nations, UNIfEDr NAIONs, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/
history/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
26. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (emphasis added), available at https://treaties.un.org/
doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf.
27. Compare id. at art. 2, para. 2 ("All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the
rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."), with id. at art. 1, para. 3 (including sex as distinction not to be considered in application of human rights and fundamental freedoms).
28. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, An Introduction to International Protection
6-10 (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bd5a0.pdf (tracing the history of post-World
War II refugee protection to the adoption of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and the establishment of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees).
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the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.29

The terms of the 1951 Convention prohibited member nations from
returning those who qualified as a refugee under this definition to the
country from which they fled. 3 0 The 1951 Convention, however, did not
delineate gender as a ground for refugee protection.3 1 In the years following the 1951 Convention, it became evident to the international community that refugee crises were continuing and were not confined to the
European continent.3 2 A 1967 Protocol amended the 1951 Convention to
eliminate the date restrictions so that persons fleeing from events occurring after January 1, 1951, could be considered refugees." However, the
1967 Protocol failed to establish gender as a ground for refugee
protection.3 4
Congress incorporated the 1967 Protocol's definition of a refugee into
U.S. law when it passed the Refugee Act of 1980." The Refugee Act
symbolized U.S. "commitment to . . . refugees around the world" 36 and
embodied language similar to the language used by the 1951 Convention.37 The Refugee Act also established the first statutory asylum procedure in the United States.38 Even though Congress intended the Refugee
Act to mirror the protections afforded to refugees under the 1951 Convention, adjudicators have viewed the Convention merely as a "policy
backdrop" and restrictively interpreted the provisions of the Act.3 9

29. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, July 28 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aal0.html.
30. Id. at art. 33.
31. See id. at art. 1 para. 2 (omitting gender as basis for a refugee to seek protection).
32. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, supra note 28, at 9.
33. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, para. 2, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
34. See id. (excluding gender as a factor in establishing refugee protection).
35. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 202, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)) (integrating the 1967 Protocol's definition by eliminating requisite
date restrictions for refugee status).
36. Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INr'L MIGRATION REV. 141, 142

(1981).
37. Id. at 150.
38. Id.
39. Richard B. Lillich, Invoking InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic Courts,
54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 388 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).
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Asylum Law Under the Refugee Act of 1980

Even though the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol and ratified it in 1968,40 U.S. asylum policy remained inconsistent in the years
that followed because most inquiries focused on the country of origin of
an asylum applicant, as opposed to an individualized inquiry focused on
the particular harmed or persecution suffered. 4 ' The Refugee Act of
1980 brought the United States into line with international law by amending the INA and the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 to
include a more systematic statutory basis for asylum.42 INA section
208(b) currently gives the Secretary of Homeland Security discretion to
grant asylum to an alien who qualifies as a "refugee" under INA section
101(a)(42)(A).43 That section of the INA defines a refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion[.]4
Scholars suggest the conspicuous absence of gender from the list merely
reflects the pre-1970s ignorance to gender-related issues of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, but the U.S. asylum adjudication system
has interpreted the absence to indicate a deliberate unwillingness to extend the classic definition of refugee to include gender-related violence.4 5
In 1990, the U.S. government implemented new regulations governing
the adjudication of asylum claims. 6 Asylum claims now fall under the
jurisdiction of two federal agencies. The Department of Justice oversees
the nation's immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals
40. Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGo L. RiV. 9, 11 n.7 (1981).
41. See generally id. at 9 (discussing inadequacy of a system focused on geographic
qualifications).
42. See generally Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (codifying the often dispositive key term "refugee" and
creating structure and process for asylum claims).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
44. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
45. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Batterers as Agents of the State: Challenging the Public/
Private Distinction in Intimate Partner Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 35 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 117, 139 (2012).
46. Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures,
55 Fed. Reg. 30,674, 30,680-86 (July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.1-.24 (2013)).
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(BIA). 47 Noncitizens who are already in removal proceedings may apply
for asylum as a defense to removal by filing an application with the immigration court.48 The Department of Homeland Security adjudicates affirmatively filed asylum claims for applicants who are not in removal
proceedings.49 The Secretary of Homeland Security delegates initial asylum determinations to asylum officers in the United States Customs and
Immigration Service (USCIS), who have authority to administer oaths,
verify the identity of the applicant, verify the identity of any interpreter,
present and receive evidence, and question the applicant and any
witnesses."o
If an asylum officer denies the request for asylum, USCIS refers the
applicant to an immigration judge for a full hearing on the merits of the
application." If an immigration judge does not grant asylum, the applicant can appeal the decision to the BIA, which will make an independent
judgment on the merits of the asylum application.5 2 Published decisions
of the BIA are binding precedent on all asylum officers and immigration
judges." The administrative review process has given the BIA numerous
opportunities to expound upon the requirements of an asylum claim. Additionally, many asylum officers and immigration judges misapply BIA
precedent to deny asylum protection to domestic violence victims. The
following subsections outline the four basic elements of a successful asylum claim.
i.

Persecution

The BIA defines persecution as a "threat to the life or freedom of, or
the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way that is
regarded as offensive." 54 The BIA also requires the harm or suffering be
inflicted "by a government, or persons a government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a characteristic of the victim." 5 Persecution,
however, does "not encompass all treatment that society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional." 56 Harm and suffering
47. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0-.1 (2013).
48. See id. § 208.1-.24 (outlining noncitizen asylum application process).
49. Id. § 208.14.
50. Id. § 208.9(b)-(e).
51. Id. § 208.14(c)(1).
52. Id. § 1003.1(a)(1).
53. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2013).
54. In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by In re
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
55. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996) (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N.
211, 222-23 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 1.& N. Dec. 439 (BIA
1987)).
56. In re V-T-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 792, 792, 798 (BIA 1997).
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must rise above mere discrimination, harassment, and even basic suffering in order to constitute persecution." Therefore, to receive asylum
protection, an asylum applicant must show that: (1) she suffered the requisite level of harm; and (2) the government of her native country failed
to protect her. Most domestic violence victims easily satisfy this requirement because they suffer physical harm that the BIA identifies as persecution in asylum cases.5
ii.

Well-Founded Fear

Proving past persecution is only the first step in an asylum claim. Asylum adjudicators, therefore, must next evaluate whether an applicant has
a well-founded fear of continued persecution if she were to return to her
country.5 9 Suffering past persecution merely gives rise to a rebuttable
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution in the future. 6 0 A
"well founded fear of persecution" requires that "an individual's fear of
persecution must have its basis in external, or objective, facts that show
there is a reasonable likelihood [s]he will be persecuted upon [her] return
to a particular country."61

Thus, the inquiry into whether an asylum applicant has a well-founded
fear of future persecution requires a two-part analysis: (1) whether the
applicant has a subjective fear of persecution, and (2) whether the applicant's fear is objectively reasonable. 62 The applicant's testimony that she
is afraid to return to her country usually satisfies the subjective part of
this analysis.63 To satisfy the objective requirement of the analysis, an
applicant must prove that: (1) she possesses a characteristic or belief that
her "persecutor seeks to overcome" through the infliction of harm;

57. See In re O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 26 (BIA 1998) (finding past persecution where harm constituted more than "mere discrimination and harassment").
58. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protectionfor Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. Rnv. 337, 358
(2009).
59. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (2013) (delineating the requirements of "a wellfounded fear of persecution").
60. In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 18 (BIA 1989).
61. In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 225 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by In re
Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
62. See id. at 225-26 (describing the test for persecution in terms of the alleged victim's personal fear of violence, with a reasonableness standard).
63. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2013) ("The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may
be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration."); In re Dass, 20 1.& N.
Dec. 120, 124 (BIA 1989) ("[A]n alien's own testimony may in some cases be the only
evidence available, and it can suffice where the testimony is believable, consistent, and
sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for his alleged
fear.") .
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(2) "the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware" of
the belief or characteristic possessed by the applicant; (3) the persecutor
is capable of inflicting harm on the applicant; and (4) the persecutor is
inclined to inflict harm on the applicant.6 4
iii.

The Nexus Requirement

The mere fear of persecution, no matter how well founded, does not
establish eligibility for asylum standing alone. There must be some connection between the persecution the applicant fears and one of the five
protected categories.6 ' The U.S. Supreme Court termed this connection
the "nexus" requirement.6 6 Since the enactment of the Real ID Act of
2005,67 an applicant must show that the protected ground was "at least
one central reason for [the] persecuti[on]" to satisfy this requirement.68
This change places a heavy burden on domestic violence victims, who already struggle to fit their experience into one of the five protected categories, because adjudicators insist on viewing domestic violence as
personally motivated. 9
iv.

The Five Enumerated Categories

The INA requires the persecution an asylum applicant faces to be "on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion . . . ."o As stated earlier, gender is noticeably
absent from this list.7 ' Because gender is not one of the INA's protected
grounds, domestic violence victims often claim refugee status under the
64. In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987) (citing Acosta, 19 1. & N.
Dec. at 226).
65. See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (identifying an underlying
requirement that the harmful behavior be "on accountof" the protected category) (emphasis original).
66. See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (expounding the nexus requirement); In re N-M-, 25 1. & N. Dec. 526, 529 (BIA 2011) ("The United States Supreme Court has held that to satisfy the nexus requirement for asylum and withholding of
removal, it is not sufficient that the persecutor act from 'a generalized political motive."').
67. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat 231 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
69. Shanyn Gillespie, Note, Terror in the Home: The Failure of U.S. Asylum Law to
Protect Battered Women and a Proposalto Right the Wrong of In re R-A-, 71 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 131, 155 (2003).
70. 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
71. See Andrea Binder, Gender and the "Membership in a ParticularSocial Group"
Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 CotUM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 169-71 (2001)
(suggesting the refugee definition was originally drafted to protect persons targeted in the
public sphere on racial, religious, and political grounds, while failing to recognize persons
targeted in the private sphere, at the time predominately women).
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amorphous "membership in a particular social group" ground. 7 2 According to the UNHCR, a "particular social group" is:
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic other than
the risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by
society. The characteristic will often be one that is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the
exercise of one's human rights.
The UNHCR's view, that a particular social group may be defined by
an innate characteristic alone, is the dominant view in the international
community.7 4
A UNHCR handbook interpreting the 1951 Convention, as amended
by the 1967 Protocol, states that though "[p]ersecution is normally related
to action by the authorities of the of a country[,]" "[i]t may . .. emanate
from sections of the population that do not respect the standards established by the laws of the country concerned."7 5 However, international
instruments have struggled to create a definition of a particular social
group that adequately accommodates both state-initiated persecution as
well as persecution at the hands of a non-state actor.76

72. See Andrea Binder, Gender and the "Membership in a ParticularSocial Group"
Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 Coi.UM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 167 (2001)

("The criteria of 'membership in a particular social group' . . . is an element of the universally recognized refugee definition which has become a critical point for many women
seeking asylum in the United States and elsewhere."). Cf Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular
Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505, 509-10 (1993) (illuminating the limited record
regarding the meaning of membership in a particular social group during the 1951
Convention).
73. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within The Context of Article IA(2) of The 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees, 3, U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html.
74. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of "Social Visibility" in Defining
a "ParticularSocial Group" and its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual
Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 47, 48 (2008) (stressing the BIA's
decision in In re Acosta takes the same position).
75. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4[Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992), http://www.unhcr
.org/publ/PUBL/3d58el3b4.pdf. The Handbook has frequently been regarded as authoritative in asylum decisions throughout the world and, though not binding, has been enormously influential among the countries adhering to the Convention.
76. Michael G. Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims of Domestic Violence: An Analysis of Asylum Regulations, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIs. & PUB. POL'Y 115, 119 (2008).
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In the precedential decision In re Acosta,n the BIA established a
framework for analyzing asylum claims based on membership in a particular social group and seemed to establish a substantive role for gender in
process.78 Scholars and human rights advocates hailed the decision as a
positive step for the future success of gender-related claims." However,
domestic violence victims continue to struggle to fit their claims into the
evolving BIA analytical framework for establishing membership in a particular social group.
C.

In re Acosta and the Amorphous Membership in a Particular
Social Group

In a 1985 decision, the BIA denied the asylum claim of a taxi driver
from El Salvador who said he feared persecution by both the government
and guerilla groups in his native country because he refused to join in
guerilla-sponsored work stoppages.8 0 Acosta argued that "[taxi] drivers
and persons engaged in the transportation industry of El Salvador" comprise a particular social group."t The BIA dismissed Acosta's assertions
about the government's persecution, but it was receptive to his claims of
susceptibility to guerilla persecution, because guerillas had a well-established practice of harming those who refused to join in work stoppages.82
Although the BIA recognized that Acosta faced punishment for his refusal to join in the stoppages, it said that he could have avoided that possibility by either joining in the stoppages or changing jobs." The BIA
stated that because Acosta "had the power to change" his occupation he
did not fall into the "internationally accepted concept of a refugee[.]" 84
In the Acosta decision, the BIA applied "the well-established doctrine
of ejusdem generis" to the "membership in a particular social group"
77. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
78. See id. at 233 (establishing an immutable characteristic, such as sex, may qualify as
membership in a particular social group under a case-by-case evaluation).
79. See, e.g., Helton & Nicoll, supra note 3, at 389-90 (recognizing the BIA's narrow
interpretation of In re Acosta in the Kasinga case); Karen Musalo, Ruminations on In re
Kasinga: The Decision's Legacy, 7 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 357, 366 (1998)
(highlighting Acosta's effect on future arguments for protection based on gender); Mary M.
Sheridan, Comment, In re Kasinga: The United States has Opened its Doors to Victims of
Female Genital Mutilation, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 433, 453 (1997) (applying the Acosta test
of an immutable characteristic to female genital mutilation victims).
80. Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 234.
81. Id. at 232.
82. Id. at 234-35.
83. Id. at 234.
84. Id.
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grounds in the refugee definition.8 ' The BIA explained that under the
doctrine of ejusdem generis "general words used in an enumeration with
specific words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific words."8 6 Using this doctrine, the BIA held that in order for the
particular social group ground to be comparable to the other four
grounds of persecution it should be limited to characteristics that are "immutable" and "fundamental."" The BIA interpreted the phrase "persecution on account of membership in a particular social group" to mean:
[P]ersecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member
of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as
sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a
shared past experience such as former military leadership or land
ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-bycase basis. However, whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the members of the group either
cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.88
In its interpretation, the BIA clearly indicated an applicant may establish membership in a particular social group based on gender because it is
an innate characteristic.8 The reasoning in Acosta has been persuasive in
foreign courts because it fits well with the fundamental norms of human
rights.9 0 However, despite frequent citations to Acosta, neither the BIA
nor the U.S. Courts of Appeals have adopted the plain meaning of the
holding.9 1 Unfortunately, this inconsistent application and the ongoing
lack of a clearly defined standard result in many failed asylum claims.92
In more recent precedent, the BIA has added to the requirements to establish membership in a particular social group.

85. Id. at 233.
86. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by In re
Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. (establishing sex, which generally includes the concept of gender, in its list
of possible immutable characteristics).
90. See JAMES C.

HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS

161 (Charmian Harvey

& Anne Lynas Shah eds., 1991) (lauding the applicability of the Acosta test for immutability in the international arena).
91. See Binder, supra note 71, at 179-80 (citing "contradictory court rulings" regarding gender as a "particular social group").
92. See Heyman, supra note 76, at 121 (highlighting failed asylum claims as a result of
an unclear definition of group members).
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The Additional Hurdle of Social Distinction

After establishing its definition for a particular social group in Acosta,
the BIA added a new test to the particular social group analysis. In In re
C-A-, the BIA indicated that "[t]he social visibility of the members of
a claimed social group is an important consideration in identifying the
existence of a 'particular social group' for the purpose of determining
whether a person qualifies as a refugee." 94 The BIA's "social visibility"
test looks not only for an immutable characteristic, but also asks whether
society perceives the members of the proposed group as a societal faction
because of the immutable characteristic.
In In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 96 the BIA reinforced "social visibility" as
a "requirement that the shared characteristic of the group should generally be recognizable by others in the community . . . ."9 This language

suggests that social visibility is more than one factor in the BIA's particular social group analysis because applicants who claim membership in a
particular social group must satisfy the requirement.9 8 The BIA's emphasis on "social visibility" will likely interfere with the success of future domestic violence asylum claims "[g]iven the invisibility of domestic
violence as a phenomenon . . . ."9 The test also contradicts two decades

of immigration jurisprudence without either statutory justification or interpretive analysis.'oo
In a pair of recent decisions addressing particular social group analysis,
the BIA recast the "social visibility" test-renaming it "social distinction."1o The BIA stated the change clarified that "social visibility" was
never intended to mean literal or "ocular visibility" as interpreted by
some adjudicators.1 02 The BIA explained "[the] new name more accurately describes the function of the requirement."1 03 The BIA, however,
93. In re C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006).
94. Id. at 951.
95. See id. at 959-60 (discussing visibility in conjunction with innateness of the group
characteristic).
96. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 74 (BIA 2007).
97. Id. at 74. "Whether a proposed group has a shared characteristic with the requisite 'social visibility' must be considered in the context of the country of concern and the
persecution feared." Id.
98. Barbara R. Barreno, Note, In Search of Guidance: An Examination of Past, Present, and Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 64 VAND. L. RE-v.
225, 242 (2011).
99. Fatma, supra note 74, at 94.
100. Id.
101. In re W-G-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014); In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 227 (BIA 2014).
102. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 211; M-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 234.
103. M-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 236.
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failed to give any clear indication of how the change may affect women
pursuing domestic violence asylum claims.o 4
III.

HISTORY OF GENDER-RELATED ASYLUM CLAIMS
IN THE UNITED STATES

In recent years, the international community has been quick to respond
to general human rights violations.' 0 5 However, "[h]uman rights have
not been women's rights-not in theory or in reality, not legally or socially, not domestically or internationally."' 06 Unfortunately, "[w]hat is
done to women is either too specific to women to be seen as human or
too generic to human beings to be seen as specific to women."' 0 7 Scholars argue women receive less protection because the founding interests of
asylum law-to protect educated elite male applicants who fled communism' 0 8-constrain its application. More specifically, the U.S. asylum adjudication system produces inconsistent judgments regarding genderrelated claims that "have fostered a lack of predictability and efficiency in
administering [future] claims."' 0 9 Even though "asylum adjudicators
have [recently] extended protections to [some] women asserting genderrelated persecution, they have denied similar protection to others."" 0
This Part traces the history of gender-related claims in the United States
from their treacherous beginning in the 1970s to the more recent breakthrough in In re Kasinga in the mid-1990s.
A.

Early Gender-Related Asylum Decisions

An analysis of early gender-related asylum claims in the United States
reveals a disturbing tendency of the courts to view domestic violence and
rape as private actions that do not qualify as persecution. Until the 1970s,
"female-specific violence within most countries was considered part of
the private sphere beyond state responsibility" and "little to no discussion
104. See generally W-G-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 208; M-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at
227.
105. Hannah R. Shapiro, Note and Comment, The Future of Spousal Abuse as a Gender-Based Asylum Claim: The Implications of the Recent Case of In re R-A-, 14 TEMP.
INTr'L & CoMr. L.J. 463, 467 (2000).
106. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights,
17 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 5, 5 (1994).

107. Id. at 6.
108. See Harold Hongju Koh, Who Are the Archetypal "Good" Aliens?, 88 AM. Soc'v
INT-'L L. 450, 451 (1994) (describing the United States' version of a "'good' alien" in these
terms).
109. Lucy Akinyi Orinda, Note, Securing Gender-Based Persecution Claims: A Proposed Amendment to Asylum Law, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMFN & L. 665, 674 (2011).
110. Id.
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of violence against women as an interstate responsibility" existed until
the end of the 1990s.1 11 The following subsections present some of the
more notorious failures of the U.S. asylum adjudication system regarding
gender-related violence.
i. In re Pierre' 1 2
In a 1975 decision, the BIA dismissed the appeal of a Haitian woman
who was seeking withholding of deportation based on years of abuse that
she suffered at the hands of her husband, a deputy in Haitian Government.' 1 3 Ms. Pierre testified that her husband threatened to kill her on
numerous occasions and attempted to kill her on one occasion by burning
down her home.' 14 Ms. Pierre hid with relatives and eventually escaped
Haiti for the United States, out of fear of her husband." 5 Ms. Pierre's
cousin, who appeared as witness, confirmed Ms. Pierre's claims of abuse
and a letter from the Department of State confirmed that her husband
was a deputy in the Haitian Government (a position analogous to a U.S.
Senator).' 1 6 Ms. Pierre argued, "because of the high political position
held by her husband, she would effectively be foreclosed from receiving
adequate legal or physical protection in Haiti," which amounts to government persecution."
The BIA held that Ms. Pierre was not entitled to
protection because she "[did] not allege that her husband [sought] to persecute her on account of her race, religion, or political beliefs.""' The
BIA further stated "[t]he motivation behind his alleged actions appear[ed] to be strictly personal."119
ii.

Campos-Guardadov. INS12 0

In a 1987 decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA's denial of asylum in a case in which the facts were particularly appalling."z'
Ms. Campos, the asylum applicant, testified that while she was visiting
her uncle, the leader of a local agricultural cooperative that was formed
111. LISA S. ALFREDSON, CREATING HUMAN RIGirrs: How NONCITIZENS MADE SEX
PERSECUTION MATTER TO THE WORLD 85 (2009).
112. In re Pierre. 15 I. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 462.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 461-62.
117. Id. at 462.
118. In re Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 463 (BIA 1975).
119. Id.
120. Campos-Guardado v. I.N.S., 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987).
121. See id. at 286-87 (denying deportation withholding for Sofia Campos-Guardado
of El Salvador).
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through a controversial agrarian land reform, a group of armed guerillas
attacked his house.122 The assailants tied the hands and feet of everyone
that was in the house and dragged them to the rim of the farm's waste
pit. 1 2 3 Ms. Campos further testified that the guerillas "forc[ed] the women to watch[] [as] they hacked the flesh from the men's bodies with
machetes, finally shooting them to death." 124 The guerillas then raped
Ms. Campos and her female cousins as they chanted political slogans.12 5
Later, Ms. Campos recognized a local boy as one of her assailants, and he
threatened to kill her if she broke her silence.126 The Fifth Circuit stated
Ms. Campos was not entitled to asylum because she had not proven persecution based on political opinion or membership in a particular social
group.12 7 The court acknowledged that the attack on the uncle's home
was politically motivated, but it determined the rape and the subsequent
threats of reprisal were personally motivated.' 2 8
iii. Gomez v. INS129
In 1991, the Second Circuit denied an asylum claim of an applicant who
asserted that she was a member in particular social group defined as "women who have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran guerillas."' 3 0 The Second Circuit determined that Ms. Gomez failed to
"produce evidence that women who have previously been abused by the
guerillas possess common characteristics-other than gender and
youth-such that would-be persecutors could identify them as members of
The court stated the "[p]ossession of broadlythe purported group."'
based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow
individuals with membership in a particular group."' 32
B.

Seeds of Change in the View of Gender-Related Claims in the
United States

In the 1990s, the U.S. stance on gender-related persecution began to
change, due in large part to pressure from international organizations and

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 287.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Campos-Guardado v. I.N.S., 809 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 291.
Id. at 288.
Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 663.
Id. at 664.
Id.
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changed perspectives on women's rights.13 3 In 1991, the UNHCR recommended that certain women qualified as a particular social group and
urged countries to create their own guidelines for providing protection
for these groups.134 The 1993 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women condemned domestic violence as one of the "crucial social mechanisms by which women
Soon afare forced into a subordinate position compared with men."'
ter, Canada became the first country to recognize gender as a basis for a

grant of asylum. 1 3 6
In 1995, the INS Office of International Affairs issued a memorandum
to assist asylum officers with adjudicating gender-related asylum claims,
including those based on domestic violence, entitled "Considerations for
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims for Women." 1 37 It highlighted the recent international development that had "contributed directly to the formulation of the U.S. guidelines.",1 3 The memorandum
also set forth guidelines designed to increase gender-sensitivity in the assessment, to provide a legal framework for the analysis of such claims,
and to promote consistency in the adjudication of such claims.13 9 It
stated both rape and domestic violence may serve as evidence of past
persecution. 4 0 The document referred to domestic violence as a form of
"private action" in contrast to "public acts" committed by or attributed to
a foreign government.' 4 ' It directed asylum officers analyzing claims involving domestic violence and other private actions, which the home
country does not protect against, to do the following:
In such situations, the officer must explore the extent to which the
government can or does offer protection or redress [to victims], and
133. But see Alfredson, supra note 111, at 92-102 (indicating it is not clear whether
such global change changed the United States' practice or if the United States' view only
became apparent after international interest).
134. Id. at 101-02.
135. Declaration, supra note 10.
136. See ALFE-DsoN, supra note 111, at 4 (recognizing Canada as the first country to
recognize gender as basis for granting asylum); see generally Chairperson Guidelines 4:
Women Refugee Claimants FearingGender-Related Persecution,CAN. IMMIGR. AND RE-uGEEiz BOARD, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/GuiDir/Pages/Guide
Dir04.aspx (last visited Dec. 29, 2013) (describing the way in which gender qualifies for
refugee status in Canada).
137. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, INS Office of Int'l Affairs, to all INS Asylum
Officers and HQASM Coordinators, Consideration for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women (May 26, 1995), availableat http://www.state.gov/s/l/65633.htm.
138. Id. at 2-4.
139. Id. at 1.
140. See id. at 4 (listing gender specific asylum claims for women "servling] as evidence of past persecution on account of one or more of the five grounds").
141. Id. at 18.
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the extent to which the risk of harm extends nationwide.

. .

. Asylum

adjudicators should carefully explore the circumstances giving rise to
the harm or risk of harm, as well as the extent to which government
protection would have been available in other parts of the country.
The adjudicator must consider whether protection was available as a
factual matter as well as in the law of the country and whether, under
all circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect a woman to seek
residency elsewhere in her country.' 4 2
However, the guidelines failed to provide a cohesive framework for the
analysis of gender-related asylum claims and were not binding on asylum
officers or immigration courts.14 3 Therefore, victims of gender-related violence were left waiting for a more substantial change in U.S. asylum law
and policy.
C.

In re Kasinga: A Breakthroughfor Gender-Related Claims

One year after the INS issued the INS memorandum for adjudicating
gender-related asylum claims, the BIA paved the way for successful gender-related asylum claims with the decision in In re Kasigna.14 4 The BIA
decided to grant asylum to a woman from Togo based on her membership
in particular social group comprised of women in a Togalese tribe expected to undergo female genital mutilation.145 The INS memorandum
was clearly influential, and the BIA quoted the statement that "rape ... ,
sexual abuse and domestic violence, infanticide and genital mutilation ...
may serve as evidence of past persecution."T4 6 The BIA also stated that
"gender-based, or gender-related, asylum claims within the 'membership
in a particular social group' construct .

.

. [are] entirely appropriate and

consistent with the developing trend of jurisprudence in the United States
and Canada as well as with international norms."1 4 7 The BIA noted that
this particular type persecution satisfies the nexus requirement because
female genital mutilation is "characterized as a form of 'sexual oppression' that is 'based on the manipulation of women's sexuality in order to
assure male dominance and exploitation.' "148
142. Id. at 18.
143. See id. at 4 (explaining only "some countries" contain gender-discriminatory provisions and the recommended procedures are no more than "considerations" officers
should "bear in mind").
144. See In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 377 (BIA 1996) (citing U.N. interpretations and U.S. case law in concluding asylum claims may be reviewed on a gender-specific
basis).
145. Id. at 368.
146. Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 377.
148. Id. at 366.
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Even though the BIA explicitly recognized gender as part of the determination of one's membership in a particular social group in Kasigna, the
holding was severely limited because the BIA included characteristics of
(1) not having been mutilated, (2) being a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo, and (3) opposing the practice of female
genital mutilation in the group's definition.' 4 9 This narrow construction
has limited the holding's precedential value.o50 As the following stories
R-A- and L-R- will illustrate, the narrow scope has become especially
troublesome
in adjudicating gender-related claims for domestic violence
15
victims.
IV.

THE BROKEN SYSTEM FOR ADJUDICATING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ASYLUM CLAIMS

Domestic violence asylum claims are a new and emerging type of asylum claim. Domestic violence did not receive societal and legal recognition in the United States until the second half of the twentieth century.'
Due to the recent nature of this shift, remnants of a patriarchal system
continue to plague the U.S. asylum adjudication system and the inaccurate view that domestic violence is private matter continues to influence
many decisions.'

As stated earlier, most domestic violence asylum applicants seek protection because of their membership in a particular social group. 15 Recent decisions like Kasinga illustrate that the difficulty in asserting
domestic violence asylum claims does not lie in the recognition of genderrelated claims, but in determining how to define one's social group in
such a way that is not overly broad or circular. 5 5 This Part reveals the
fundamental flaws in the U.S. asylum adjudication system that produce
the inconsistent and inefficient results in adjudicating domestic violence
asylum claims.
149. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (BIA 1996) (describing the three
defining characteristics of the case and their specific bearing on the decision).
150. See Helton & Nicoll, supra note 3, at 378 (explaining Kasinga did not expand
beyond the facts presented).
151. See In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 924-25 (BIA 1999) (distinguishing R-A-'s
case from Kasinga).
152. Cianciarulo, supra note 45, at 133.
153. See id. at 134-36, 155 (addressing asylum barriers such as the historic "private
issue" view of domestic violence).
154. See Binder, supra note 71, at 167 (identifying membership in a particular social
group as a critical issue for women seeking asylum).
155. See Department of Homeland Security's Supplemental Brief at 6, In re L-R(April 13, 2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdflus/20090716-asy
lum-brief.pdf (redacted) (agreeing a social group must be narrowly tailored as a group
described only as "persecuted" is too overly broad for application of UN guidelines).
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In re R-A- and the Emergence of the ParticularSocial Group
Category

Following the decision in Kasigna, the BIA did not address genderrelated asylum claims for three years until it published its controversial In
re R-A- decision. 15 6 In a sharply divided ten-to-five vote, the BIA reversed the grant of asylum to a Guatemalan woman who had been severely beaten and psychologically abused by her husband for more than a
The decision in R-A- sparked an outcry from both scholars
decade.'
and legislators due to the shocking facts of the case.'
R-A-'s testimony
revealed that her husband abused her in a variety of ways, including: dislocating her jaw because her menstrual period was late, kicking her violently in her spine when she would not submit to an abortion, raping and
sodomizing her repeatedly, passing sexually transmitted diseases to her as
a result of his extramarital affairs, pulling her by the hair, knocking her
unconscious, whipping her with electric cords, threatening to deface and
decapitate her with a machete, pistol-whipping her, and breaking windows and a mirror with her head.' 5 9
The physical and mental abuse was so severe that R-A- eventually
tried to commit suicide.1 6 0 R-A-'s husband fostered her fear by telling
her about the babies and elderly persons he had murdered while serving
in the Guatemalan Army.' 6 ' R-A-'s husband further leveraged his military service by constantly reminding her that "calling the police would be
futile" because of his military connections.1 62 Her husband's claims of
futility proved true because she contacted the police on two separate occasions to assist her at her home with no response.16 3 On three occasions,
police issued summons for R-A-'s husband to appear in court, which he
simply ignored."
When she was finally given the opportunity to appear
before a local judge, the judge "told her that he would not interfere in

156. See generally In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (finding R-A- ineligible for asylum status despite enduring severe spousal abuse).
157. See id. at 927-28 (explaining BIA's finding the woman in question did not meet
the UN qualifications of a social group for asylum).
158. See Haley Schaffer, Note and Comment, Domestic Violence and Asylum in the
United States: In re R-A-, 95 Nw. U.L. REV. 779, 781 (2001) (noting several members of
Congress wrote letters to then Attorney General Janet Reno expressing concern about the
outcome of the case and urging her to overturn the decision); Shapiro, supra note 105, at
463 (asserting the decision struck a "severe blow to international women's rights").
159. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908-09.
160. Id. at 909.
161. Id. at 908.
162. Id. at 909.
163. Id.
164. See id. (highlighting lack of accountability in domestic abuse proceedings).
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domestic disputes."' 65 As a result, the inaction by the Guatemalan government forced R-A- to flee Guatemala and seek protection in the
United States.16 6
The Immigration Judge who heard R-A-'s case granted her application for asylum on the basis of membership in a particular social group
defined as "Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under
male dominion."1 67 The BIA paraphrased the Immigration Judge's holding as follows:
[S]uch a group was cognizable and cohesive, as members shared the
common and immutable characteristics of gender and the experience
of having been intimately involved with a male companion who practices male domination through violence. The Immigration Judge
then held that members of such a group are targeted for persecution
by the men who seek to dominate and control them.' 68
R-A-'s victory was short lived because the then-INS immediately appealed the decision and argued that the Immigration Judge incorrectly
interpreted the term "particular social group. "169 The government contended that R-A- was not abused as part of a larger social group, but
rather was abused because her husband was a violent man.170 Although
the BIA went to great lengths to convey that it found R-A-'s husband's
conduct "deplorable," it ultimately agreed with the government's position
that R-A- failed to establish herself as a member of a particular social
group as recognized under the INA.'
The BIA found that R-A-'s proposed social group failed for two reasons: (1) it was not a "group that is recognized and understood to be a
societal faction, or is otherwise a recognized segment of the population,
within Guatemala" and (2) there was no evidence "that the characteristic
of being abused is one that is important within Guatemalan society." 17 2
The BIA characterized R-A-'s proposed social group as "a legally
crafted description of some attributes of her tragic personal circum-

165. In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 909 (BIA 2001).
166. Id. at 909.
167. Id. at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Karen Musalo, In re R-A-: An Analysis of the Decision and its Implications, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1177, 1181 (1999) (explaining how INS believed R-Aneither demonstrated harm nor feared persecution because of her membership in a particular social group).
170. See In re R-A-, 22 1.& N. Dec. 906, 914-15 (BIA 1999) (stating the record did not
show R-A-'s husband abused her because of what she believed in or her political views).
171. Id. at 910, 927-28.
172. Id. at 918-19.
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stances.""' In addition, the BIA stated that even if R-A-'s proposed
social group was acceptable, she failed to establish a proper nexus between the group and her husband's actions toward her: "[T]he respondent has not established that her husband has targeted and harmed [her]
because he perceived her to be a member of this particular social
group."74 To support its assertion, the BIA noted that the persecutor
targeted only his wife and did not target other members of the proposed
social group:
The record indicates that [the respondent's husband] has targeted
only the respondent. The respondent's husband has not shown an
interest in any member of this group other than the respondent herself. The respondent fails to show how other members of the group
may be at risk of harm from him. If group membership were the
motivation behind his abuse, one would expect to see some evidence
of it manifested in actions toward other members of the same
group.' 75
The BIA went as far as stating that R-A-'s husband's violence was due
to "his warped perception of and reaction to her behavior,... [a] psychological disorder, pure meanness, or no apparent reason at all."1 76 The
BIA also stated that "construing private acts of violence to be qualifying
governmental persecution, by virtue of the inadequacy of protection,
would obviate, perhaps entirely, the 'on account of' requirement in the
[INA].""' The BIA did acknowledge that "societal attitudes and the
concomitant effectiveness (or lack thereof) of governmental intervention
very well may have contributed to the ability of the respondent's husband
to carry out his abusive actions over a period of many years.",17 Ultimately, the BIA determined that because R-A-'s husband's actions were
not "desired" or "encouraged" within Guatemala she was not entitled to
refugee protection." 9
However, this was not the end of the road for R-A-. In late 2000, as a
direct response to the decision in R-A-, President Bill Clinton directed
the Department of Justice to submit new regulations that would modify
the INS guidelines in an effort to alleviate inconsistences in the case law
for interpreting the term "particular social group" as well as create asy-

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 919.
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id. at 927.
In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 923 (BIA 1999).
Id. at 922.
Id. at 923-24.
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lum eligibility in the context of gender-related claims. 80 In January 2001,
just weeks before the change in presidential administrations, Attorney
General Janet Reno vacated the decision in R-A- and remanded the case
to the BIA for reconsideration upon final issuance of the new regulations.' 8 ' Although the regulations were initially published in 2000, the
U.S. government has not issued the guidelines in a final form.1 82
In February 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft lifted the stay in
R-A- and referred the case to his office for a final decision.' 8 3 However,
DHS submitted a brief to the Attorney General's office supporting a
grant of asylum in R-A- and requested that Attorney General Ashcroft
wait for final publication of the proposed regulations before issuing a decision in the case. 1 8 4 In January 2005, Ashcroft remanded R-A- to the
BIA for reconsideration once the final regulations were published."'
In September 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey certified the
case to himself and lifted the stay so that the BIA could reconsider the
case without waiting for the finalized regulations.' 86 The BIA's inability
to act in R-A- and many similar cases by domestic violence asylum applicants was a substantial reason for Attorney General Mukasey to lift the
stay.' 8 7 In October 2009, DHS wrote a letter to the Executive Office of
Immigration Review explaining the Department "had reviewed addi-

180. Natalie Rodriguez, Give Us Your Weary But Not Your Battered: The Department
of Homeland Security, Politics and Asylum for Victims of Domestic Violence, 18 Sw. J.
INT'L LAw 317, 328 (2011); see generally Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg.
76,588-01 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (establishing what
adjustments should be made to the U.S. asylum system and laws).
181. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 906 (A. G. 2001); Rodriguez, supra note 180, at
328.
182. See Rodriguez, supra note 180, at 345 (stating the proposed regulations of 2000
did not lead to a final judgment on battered women who seek asylum). See generally Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (failing to become a federal regulation).
183. Musalo, supra note 13, at 126; see generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2013)
(providing the Attorney General authority to refer any case before the BIA to his office).
184. Heyman, supra note 76, at 127-28 (reporting the DHS's brief in support of R-Awas a "surprise to many").
185. In re R-A- (R-A- II), 23 I. & N. Dec. 694, 694 (BIA 2005); see Heyman, supra
note 76, at 128 (affirming Attorney General Ashcroft's remand of the case).
186. In re R-A- (R-A- III), 24 1. & N. Dec. 629 (BIA 2008); see also Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1199, 1205 (2009) (describing Mukasey's decision
to remand the case to the BIA which allows them the discretion to "issue a precedent
decision establishing a uniform standard nationwide").
187. See In re R-A- (R-A- III), 24 1. & N. Dec. 629, 630-31 (BIA 2008) (reviewing the
history of R-A-'s case and other developments in asylum adjudication during that time).
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tional evidence provided by R.A." and "found that she was 'eligible for
asylum and merits . . . asylum as a matter of discretion.' 18 8
In December 2009, an immigration judge finally granted asylum to
R-A- after a fourteen-year-long legal battle. 9 "The immigration
judge's decision simply read, '[i]nasmuch as there is no binding authority
on the legal issues raised in this case, I conclude that I can conscientiously
accept what is essentially the agreement of the parties [to grant
asylum].' "190

B.

In re L-R- and New Proposed Social Group Definitions

During the same period of time as R-A-'s administrative nightmare,
another domestic violence victim, L-R-, fled Mexico to the United
States, seeking protection from her common-law husband after enduring
almost two decades of abuse at his hands.' 91 L-R- and her three children arrived in United States in 2004 and applied for asylum in 2005.192
USCIS immediately referred her asylum application to an Immigration
Judge because she filed for asylum past the one-year deadline after entering the United States.' 93
In her asylum application, L-R- presented facts similar to those of
R-A-. L-R- was only a teenager when her basketball coach began to
sexually abuse her.1 9 4 He was fourteen years her senior and a physical
education teacher at her boarding school when the abuse started.' 95
When L-R- was set to leave the boarding school after graduation, he
abducted her at gunpoint and held her captive for several years. 1 96 Over
the years, he violently and repeatedly raped her, eventually impregnating
her.19 7 L-R- attempted to escape during her pregnancy, but he caught
her and beat her.' 98 When she fell asleep that evening, he poured a flammable liquid all over her bed and set the bed on fire while she was sleep188. Rodriguez, supra note 180, at 333.
189. In re R-A-, CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/
our-work/matter-r (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
190. Rodriguez, supra note 180, at 333.
191. Amended Declaration of L-R- in Support of Application for Asylum at $1 1-2
(BIA Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716asylum-support.pdf [hereinafter Amended Declaration of L-R-] (redacted).
192. Id. at 1 2.
193. In re L-R-, CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE Sruo., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/
our-work/matter-l-r (last visited Dec. 28, 2013); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012)
(articulating the one year deadline for filing for asylum).
194. Amended Declaration of L-R-, supra note 191, at J 8.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 9 17.
197. Id. at 19 18, 20.
198. Id. at 1 20.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol16/iss3/1

26

Kyle: Safety over Semantics: The Case for Statutory Protection for Dome

2014]

SAFETY OVER SEMANTICS

531

ing." L-R- eventually gave birth to a son a few months after the child's
father tried to kill her. 2 00 L-R- attempted to use an intra uterine contraceptive device after the birth of her son to avoid a second pregnancy by
her abuser. 2 01 However, the contraceptive device cut her and caused her
to bleed when he continued to violently rape her. 2 0 2 After she removed
the contraceptive device, she became pregnant and gave birth to a second
child, and later, a third.2 0 3 Eventually, L-R- and her abuser were considered common-law husband and wife in Mexican society because of their
children and the years of forced cohabitation.2 0 4
On the multiple occasions L-R- reported the abuse to the police, they
told her that her situation was a private matter and refused to take action
201
On another occasion, a judge told her that
despite her visible injuries.
he would assist her, but only if she "had sex with him" first. 2 0 6 After her
attempts to seek protection from her common-law husband failed, the
violence escalated.2 0 7 On one occasion, he found her walking home
alone from the bus stop and accused her of seeing other men. 2 0 8 After
accusing her, he violently attacked L-R- and hit her so hard he dislocated her nose, causing permanent numbness and paralysis on the left
side of her face and partial numbness on the right.2 09 During another
episode of violence, he threatened to kill her with a machete. 2 10 L-Reventually escaped and paid a smuggler who facilitates the migration of
people across the U.S. border to smuggle her and her three children into
the country.2 1 1
On October 15, 2007, an immigration judge denied L-R-'s application
for asylum because she claimed membership in a particular social group
defined as "'Mexican women in an abusive relationship who are unable
to leave."' 2 1 2 L-R- subsequently appealed the decision in early 2008.213

199. Id.
200. Amended Declaration of L-R-, supra note 1981, at 1 22.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at $9 22, 24.
204. Id. at 18.
205. Id. at 9 24.
206. Amended Declaration of L-R-, supra note 191, at 1 37.
207. Id. at 28.
208. Id. at 1 30.
209. Id. at 911 30-31.
210. Id. at 1 30.
211. Id. at 1 62.
212. Department of Homeland Security's Supplemental Brief at 2, 5, In re L-R(Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-asy
lum-brief.pdf (redacted) [hereinafter Supplemental Brief].
213. Id. at 2-3.
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In December 2008, the BIA requested supplemental briefing from the
parties involved in the case.21 4 In April 2009, DHS submitted a supplemental brief to the BIA that "represent[ed] the Department's current position as to whether victims of domestic violence . . . are members of a
particular social group . . . and can otherwise establish eligibility for asy-

lum." 2 1 5 DHS recommended that the BIA remand L-R-'s case back to
the immigration judge to take into account "alternative formulations" of
L-R-'s particular social group. 2 16 The brief explained that in order to
show membership in a particular social group, an applicant must demonstrate that its members "share a common immutable or fundamental trait,
[that is] socially distinct or 'visible,' and . . . defined with sufficient partic-

ularity to allow reliable determinations about who comes within the

group definition." 2 17

DHS also "depart[ed] from [its] normal practice" of focusing its arguments solely on the claims raised by the applicant by suggesting two alternative formulations of a particular social group that could apply to
L-R-'s case.21 8 The first social group formulation offered by DHS was
nearly identical to L-R-'s original formulation, except that DHS removed the word "abusive" to eliminate circularity: "Mexican women in
domestic relationships who are unable to leave." 2 19 The second formulation was a much narrower formulation: "Mexican women who are viewed
as property by virtue of their position within a domestic relationship." 2 20
In August 2010, an immigration judge granted L-R- asylum after DHS
made a "favorable recommendation" on her behalf.2 2 1 While the grants
of asylum in In re R-A- and In re L-R- demonstrate that domestic violence asylum claims are legitimate, inconsistency plagues the adjudication
process because there is no clear precedent or regulations addressing how
asylum officers and immigration judges should handle these claims.2 22

214. Id. at 1, 3.
215. Id. at 4.
216. Id. at 5.
217. Supplemental Brief, supra note 212, at 16.
218. Id. at 4-5.
219. Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id.
221. Julia Peterson, Asylum Granted to Mexican Women in Case Setting Standard on
Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12,2010, http://nytimes.com/2010/08/13/us/politics/13asy
lum.html.
222. See Anker et al., supra note 2, at 710 (comparing disparate outcomes in asylum
cases based on domestic violence beginning in the mid-1990s).
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Possibility of Future Inconsistencies

Future domestic violence asylum applicants have an inconsistent and
inefficient system waiting to adjudicate their claims.2 23 They cannot rely
on the grant of asylum in R-A- and L-R- as precedent to establish their
claims.22 4 In both cases, the immigration judge did not have to make an
independent determination regarding the proposed social groups because
the judge accepted DHS's suggestion that the women receive a grant of
asylum.2 2 5 R-A- and L-R- are the only two domestic violence asylum
applicants whose claims have been granted in this manner.22 6 This lack of
precedent presents a problem for future "applicants who have cognizable
claims ... but who do not have experiences similar to L-R- and R-A-"
because the applicants "may not know how to articulate their particular
social group or otherwise proceed with their claims.",22
Additionally, there is no consensus among asylum adjudicators regarding the relevant framework for particular social group analysis. 228 The
most frequently used analysis mirrors the "'immutability framework"' of
Acosta, which defines a particular social group by an "immutable, unchangeable characteristic or a past or present voluntary association entered into for reasons protected by basic human rights principles that are
considered 'fundamental to human dignity. '"229 However, asylum adjudicators do not agree as to whether gender falls within the refugee definition regardless of the applied analytical framework.2 30
The myriad of approaches used by asylum adjudicators to analyze particular social group definitions has frustrated efforts of applicants to formulate particular social group definitions that will establish their
eligibility for asylum. 2 3 ' Even though the factual presentations of their
claims remain unchanged, the current analytical framework forces asylum
223. See Barreno,supra note 98, at 250 (discussing the failure of the INS to define key
terms like "refugee" and recognizing difficulties facing asylum seekers because of the inability to predict future outcomes absent clarification from the BtA).
224. See id. (indicating an important question remains after R-A- and L-R-: "Should
all current and future domestic violence asylum applicants now attempt to fit their cases
into the particular groups suggested by DHS, or are there other ways that they can succeed
with their claims?").
225. Id.
226. Id. at 251; see Sarah Siddiqui, Note, Membership in a ParticularSocial Group:All
Approaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 ARIz. L. Rrv. 505, 517-18 n.119 (2010)
("[T]he [BIA]'s decision applies only to [R-A-]'s case and does not officially grant license
for all domestic violence applicants to qualify.").
227. Barreno, supra note 98, at 252.
228. See Siddiqui, supra note 226, at 516 (advocating for such consensus).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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applicants and those advocating on their behalf to argue semantically and
craft unique definitions to fit their claims into the particular social group
category.2 32 Therefore, particular social group definitions vary wildly and
are vulnerable to the perception that they are self-serving legal theories
tailored to fit the applicant's individual claim.2 33 This vulnerability has
proven fatal to numerous legitimate domestic violence asylum claims because "the acceptance of a proposed social group . . . often depend[s] on

the subjective determination of the adjudicator .... "234
A 2007 study analyzed databases from four levels of the asylum adjudication process, including decisions administered by 884 asylum officers
over a period of seven years, 225 immigration judges over a period of
four years, 126,000 decisions of the BIA over a period of six years, and
4,215 decisions by the by the U.S. Courts of Appeals over a period of two
years.2 35 The study revealed that "[i]n many cases, the most important
moment in an asylum case is the instant in which a clerk randomly assigns
an application to a particular asylum officer or immigration judge." 23 6
The study also revealed that an asylum applicant's potential for success is
affected not only by one's assignment to a particular immigration judge,
but also by the gender of the immigration judge and his or her past work
experience.
This gender bias is especially alarming in the context of
gender-related claims because asylum adjudicators apply the INA's gender-neutral refugee definition more liberally to persecution commonly affecting men than to persecution like domestic violence and rape that are
unique to, or concentrated against, women. 2 38 As the study's authors indicate: "the outcome of a refugee's quest for safety in America should be
influenced more by law and less by a spin of the wheel of fate that assigns
her case to a particular government official." 2 3 9
The reluctance by the United States to recognize domestic violence
asylum claims is largely a result of the unfounded fear that establishing
domestic violence as grounds for asylum will immediately inundate the

232. See Heyman, supra note 76, at 149 (recognizing this as a pitfall for many domestic
violence victims seeking asylum).
233. Cianciarulo, supra note 45, at 120-21.
234. Id. at 121.
235. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparitiesin Asylum Adjudication,
60 STAN. L. REv. 295, 296 (2007).

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Binder,supra note 71 (arguing asylum law developed a split between masculine and feminine persecution, allowing men to be protected but preventing women from
seeking relief).
239. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 235, at 305.
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United States with women seeking asylum. 2 40 This fear has resulted in a
higher burden of proof for domestic violence asylum applicants because
they usually have to link their abuse and particular social group to an
additional protected ground, such as religion.2 4' Scholars argue that
"[t]his reality suggests that asylum law, both inherently and in its implementation, currently may operate in a discriminatory manner and may
fail to offer women the same level of protection it offers male asylum
seekers." 2 4 2 Scholars agree that such treatment discounts the current
trend recognizing violence against women as a human rights violation.24 3
An analysis of Canada's experience following a positive domestic violence precedent and the adoption of the Canadian Gender Guidelines in
1993 mitigates concerns raised by the floodgate argument.2 4 4 During the
two-year period following these developments, "there were 40,000 refugee claims filed in Canada, of which only two percent were genderbased[,]" presumably encompassing all gender related claims not only domestic violence. 245 The unfortunate reality is few women have the resources to flee their country of origin to seek protection because such a
departure is difficult, expensive, and traumatic. 246
Canada's recognition of gender-related claims also reveals another unfortunate flaw that plagues the current system for adjudicating domestic
violence asylum claims in the United States. On December 5, 2002, the
United States and Canada entered into an agreement that forecloses the
possibility of applying for asylum in both countries after the effective date
of the agreement.24 7 The agreement "'allocates responsibility between
the United States and Canada whereby one or the other country (but not

240. See Sheridan, supra note 79, at 457 (identifying several reasons why the fear of
"opening the floodgates" is unwarranted and noting this fear serves as a pretext for rejecting gender-based claims in the United States).
241. See In re S-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1328, 1336 (BIA 2000) (holding a Moroccan
woman who was physically, verbally, and emotionally abused by her father suffered persecution on account of her religious beliefs); Cianciarulo, supra note 45, at 121 ("The acceptance of a proposed social group may often depend .. . whether another protected groundrace, religion, nationality, or political opinion-is implicated.").
242. Helton & Nicoll, supra note 3.
243. Shapiro, supra note 105, at 486.
244. See Patricia A. Seith, Note, Escaping Domestic Violence: Asylum as a Means of
Protection for Battered Women, 97 Co-um. L. REV. 1804, 1838-39 (1997) (refuting the
floodgate argument by comparing United States' asylum law standards to Canada's).
245. Id. at 1838.
246. Id. at 1839.
247. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims
from Nationals of Third Countries, U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 2002, T.I.A.S. No. 04-1229 (entered
into force Dec. 29, 2004), available at http://www.cic.gc.calenglish/department/laws-policy/
safe-third.asp.
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both) will assume responsibility for processing the claims of certain asylum seekers . . . ."'248 The agreement also requires refugees to apply for
asylum in the country that they arrive in first.24 9 Since Canada has a wellestablished acceptance of gender-related claims on the basis of domestic
violence, critics of the agreement assert that women will lose asylum
claims in the United States that they would have otherwise won in Canada, without maintaining an opportunity to later assert the claim in Canada.2 50 This result is especially alarming considering most domestic
violence victims fleeing Central and South America arrive in the United
States first due to the geography of the North American continent.2 51
The flaws and inconsistencies that plague the current system necessitate a fundamental change to the current approach for adjudicating domestic violence asylum claims in the United States. Prospective domestic
violence asylum applicants and adjudicators of these claims have limited
guidance going forward, and little is expected to change without a precedent-setting decision by the BIA or modified DHS regulations.25 2 According to DHS:
A final rule is the best vehicle for providing much needed guidance
on the adjudication of social group asylum claims, including those
based on domestic violence. The legal standards governing [domestic violence asylum claims] have been obscured by the uneven development of case law and by the need for a coherent administrative
framework for interpretation on these issues.253
Thus, a final rule, like the following proposal, is the proper solution to
the administrative mess that prevents domestic violence victims from receiving asylum protection in the United States.

248. Andrew F. Moore, Unsafe in America: A Review of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement, 47 SANTA CLARA L. Rvv. 201, 202 (2007).

249. See Audrey Macklin, DisappearingRefugees: Reflections on the Canada-U.S.Safe
Third Country Agreement, 36 COLUM. Hum. Rrs. L. Rivv. 365, 381 (2005) ("The Agreement is premised on the idea that refugee claimants ought to apply for protection in the
first country of arrival (as between Canada and the United States), rather than choose
their preferred destination. This selectivity is disparaged in the expression 'forumshopping."').
250. Moore, supra note 248, at 241-42.
251. See id. at 252, 284 (addressing the impact of the U.S.-Canadian agreement on the
migration of refugees).
252. See generally Barreno, supra note 98, at 225 (discussing "the present limitations
placed on the adjudications of domestic violence asylum claims" while assessing proposed
solutions).
253. Department of Homeland Security's Position on Respondent's Eligibility for Relief at 4, In re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (BIA 2005), availableat http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/
sites/default/files/Matter of_RADHS_Brief_02_19_2004.pdf .
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SOLUTION FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM APPLICANTS

Congress should address the inconsistent outcomes of domestic violence asylum claims and ensure the fundamentally fair and humane application of U.S. immigration law by passing the proposed International
Violence Against Women Act25 4 with a special provision for domestic violence victims seeking asylum in the United States. Congress has addressed the issue of immigrant domestic violence victims in the past. The
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) allows victims of domestic violence who are married to legal permanent residents or U.S. citizens
to self-petition for immigration status in the United Status.2 55 In 2000,
Congress passed the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of
2000.256 The Act expanded the protection provided by VAWA by extending the U-Visa to immigrant victims of domestic violence that occurred in the United States who did not have a path to lawful
immigration status when the crime occurred.25 7 During the first U.S. Report to the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the U.S. government pointed to these measures
as steps the government has taken to comply with and execute international human rights treaty obligations.2 58
A.

The Blueprint for Change: The U.S. Response to China's "One
Child Policy"

Congress has stepped in to address inconsistent and inefficient outcomes in the U.S. asylum adjudication system in the past. In 1979, China
implemented a coercive family planning policy in an effort to control the
country's expanding population.2 59 China forced compliance with the
"One-Child Policy" by imposing penalties that ranged from mere economic sanctions to more extreme measures like abortions or forced sterilizations in some cases. 26 Many individuals fled China fearing the
254. E.g., International Violence Against Women Act of 2007, S. 2279, 110th Cong.
(2007); International Violence Against Women Act of 2013, H.R. 3571, 113th Cong. (2013).
255. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC)(bbb) (2013).
256. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
H 1501-13, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
257. See id. H§ 1501-13 (setting out the provisions for battered immigrant women and
children to gain residency and naturalization).
258. See Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Purposes of the Violence Against Women Act
and International Law's Enhancement of Congressional Power, 22 Hous. J. Ir'L L. 209,
211-13 (2000) (identifying heavy reliance on the Violence Against Women Act).
259. Charles E. Schulman, Note, The Grant of Asylum to Chinese Citizens Who Oppose China's One-Child Policy: A Policy of Persecution or Population Control?, 16 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 313, 316-17 (1996).

260. See id at 317 (discussing ways in which China enforced their harsh One-Child
Policy).
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severity of the more extreme measures and sought asylum in the United
States.2 6 1 For more than a decade, asylum adjudicators issued inconsistent decisions regarding the claims due to the controversial nature of the
subject matter.2 62
In In re Chang,2 63 the BIA finally addressed the issue by denying asylum to an applicant who claimed that he would be forced to undergo
involuntary sterilization as a result of China's repressive policy. 264 The
BIA found that the applicant could not establish a well-founded fear of
persecution because the Chinese policy did not constitute persecution on
its face. 2 65 As a direct response to Chang, President George H. W. Bush
issued an executive order "granting asylum to refugees from the One
Child Policy." 2 6 6 However, when the INS subsequently issued its final
asylum regulations, the INS did not include language regarding coercive
family planning. 267 Thus, due to the omission, the BIA refused to recognize that Chang was overruled.2 6 8
On September 30, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).26 9
With this Act, Congress sought to create consistency in the adjudication
of asylum claims involving forced abortion and sterilization by addressing
this "longstanding legal gray." 2 7 0 Among its many provisions, 2 7 1 "[o]ne

261. Id. at 320.
262. See Kimberly Sicard, Note, Section 601 of IRIRA: A Long Road to a Resolution
of United States Asylum Policy Regarding Coercive Methods of Population Control,
14 GiEo. IMMIGR. L.I. 927, 933-36 (2000) (tracing the ever-changing political activity surrounding the One Child Policy from 1985 to 1994).
263. In re Chang, 20 1. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1989).
264. Id. at 47.
265. Id. at 43.
266. Sicard, supra note 262, at 934; see generally Exec. Order No. 12,711, § 4, 55 Fed.
Reg. 13,897, 13,897 (Apr. 11, 1990) ("The Secretary of State and the Attorney General are
directed to provide for enhanced consideration under the immigration laws for individuals
from any country who express a fear of persecution upon return to their country related to
that country's policy of forced abortion or coerced sterilization, as implemented by the
Attorney General's regulation effective January 29, 1990.").
267. Sicard, supra note 262, at 934.
268. Id. "[B]ecause the Attorney General omitted the interim rule from the final regulations, the Order did not have the force of law." Id.
269. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, tit. VI, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42));
see Kyle R. Rabkin, Comment, The Zero-Child Policy: How the Board of Immigration
Appeals Discriminates Against Unmarried Asylum-Seekers Fleeing Coercive Family Planning Measures, 101 Nw. U.L. REv. 965, 974-75 (2007) (providing background on IIRIRA).
270. See Michelle Chen, Leaving One-Child Behind: Chinese Immigrants Seek Asylum
in America from China's One-Child Policy, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2005, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2005/scene-chennovdec05.msp
(detailing the impact of classifying persons fleeing population control schemes as refugees).
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sentence at the end of section 601(a) [of IIRIRA]-defining 'refugee' for
the purposes of the Act-dramatically changed judicial treatment of asylum seekers fleeing coercive family-planning measures":
For purposes of determination under this Act, a person who has
been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo
such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population
control program, shall be deemed to have persecuted on account of
political opinion, and a person who has well founded fear that he or
she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a
well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 2 7 2
Section 601(a) of IIRIRA specifically enumerates that a person forced
to abort a pregnancy or undergo involuntary sterilization establishes per
se persecution.27 3 It also establishes asylum protection for those who reasonably fear they will be subjected to coercive family planning measures
if they return to their country. 274 This amendment has facilitated more
consistent adjudication for asylum claims based on coercive Chinese family planning measures, which has afforded greater protection to those
who oppose the practice. 27 5 Clear and decisive action by Congress, such
as IIRIRA, is the only solution that ensures fair adjudication of domestic
violence asylum claims under the laws of the United States.

271. Congress designed IIRIRA to "improve border control by imposing criminal
penalties for racketeering, alien smuggling, and the use or creation of fraudulent immigration-related documents and increasing interior enforcement by agencies charged with monitoring visa applications and visa abusers." Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act, Legal Information Institute, CORNERi. U. LAw Scii., http://www.law.cor

nell.edu/wex/illegal-immigration-reform-andimmigration-responsibility-act (last visited
Dec. 29, 2013). Congress also incorporated employment eligibility verification into the
Act, "including sanctions for employers who fail to comply with the regulations and restrictions on unfair immigration-related employment practices, as well as provisions governing
the disbursement of government aid to aliens." Id.
272. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, tit. VI, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42));
Rabkin, supra note 269, at 974.
273. See Chen, supra note 270 (identifying the Act as official recognition of form of
persecution).
274. Id.
275. See id. (highlighting the increase in claims from Chinese refugees and their success rate).
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The Vehicle for Change: The InternationalViolence Against
Women Act

As it did with IIRIRA, Congress should use politically expedient legislation to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act's definition of refugee so that the Act offers protection for victims of extreme cases of
domestic violence in foreign countries. The International Violence
Against Women Act (I-VAWA) has gained momentum and bipartisan
support as it works its way through the legislative process.27 6 I-VAWA
focuses on "streamlin[ing] existing efforts by the U.S. government to end
violence against women [internationally] and fund[ing] new efforts by
[non-governmental organizations] and the U.S. government to prevent violence and provide survivor services" worldwide."' "The text of the bill
begins with congressional findings on the importance of ending violence
against women"2 7 8 stating, "[A]pproximately [one] in [three] women in
the world will experience violence in her lifetime, with rates of up to [seventy] percent in some countries . . . ."279 The bill also notes the acute
violence that plagues women who are forced to flee their homelands
seeking protection. It asserts, "Displaced, refugee, and stateless women
and girls in humanitarian emergencies, conflict settings, and natural disasters face extreme violence and threats because of power inequities, including being forced to exchange sex for food and humanitarian supplies,
and being at increased risk of rape, sexual exploitation, and abuse."2 8 0
The bill states it is the policy of the United States "to systematically integrate and coordinate efforts to prevent and respond to violence against
women and girls into United States foreign policy and foreign assistance
programs" and "to enhance training and other programs to prevent and
respond to violence against women and girls in humanitarian relief, conflict, and post-conflict operations . . . .281
On October 31, 2007, then-Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) and
Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) first introduced I-VAWA to the Sen-

276. See, e.g., International Violence Against Women Act of 2007, S. 2279, 110th
Cong. (2007) (introducing the first legislation regarding international application of the
Violence Against Women Act); International Violence Against Women Act of 2013,
H.R. 3571, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing legislation to address global issues faced by women and girls).
277. Nissa Thompson, Does the InternationalViolence Against Women Act Respond to
Lessons from the Iraq War?, 23 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & Jus-r. 1, 7 (2008).
278. Id. at 8.
279. International Violence Against Women Act of 2007, S. 2279, 110th Cong.
§ 2(2)(A) (2007).
280. Id. § 2(8).
281. Id. §§ 3(5), 3(12).
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ate.2 82 The bill garnered bipartisan support from twenty cosponsoring
senators. 28 3 On April 30, 2008, Representative Howard Berman (D-California) introduced I-VAWA to the House of Representatives, where the
bill received bipartisan support from thirty cosponsoring representatives. 28 4 Although I-VAWA received substantial bipartisan support in
both houses, Congress did not vote on the bill during the 110th Congress.285 However, a 2009 poll found that eighty-two percent of Americans supported the passage of I-VAWA. 2 8 6 "This public display of
support is of great importance because it adds legitimacy" to the campaign for women's rights and places political pressure on U.S. lawmakers
to support women's rights internationally. 2 8 7
On February 4, 2010, in a rare show of bipartisan support, Senators
John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) and Barbara Boxer (D-California) of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, along with Senators Susan Collins
(R-Maine) and Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), reintroduced I-VAWA to the
111th Congress.28 8 More than thirty senators cosponsored the bill and
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended the bill for
enactment.2 89
Similarly, Representative William Delahunt (D-Massachusetts) and
134 bipartisan cosponsors reintroduced I-VAWA to the House of Representatives during the 111th Congress. 2 9 0 Representative Delahunt focused on the bill's importance to national security in his statement
supporting the bill: "Nations with the worst track record in preventing
violence against women are also the most unstable and are breeding
grounds for terrorism. It is crucial for our own national security that we
be a global leader in addressing this epidemic of gender violence . . . ."291

282. Id.
283. Id.
284. International Violence Against Women Act of 2008, H.R. 5927, 110th Cong.
(2008).
285. See International Violence Against Women Act of 2007, S. 2279, 110th Cong.
(2007) (dying in committee); International Violence Against Women Act of 2008,
H.R. 5927, 110th Cong. (2008) (dying in committee).
286. Ritu Sharma & Humaira Shahid, Standing up to Violence Against Women Worldwide, HUFFINoTON PosT (Feb. 4, 2010, 10:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ritusharma/standing-up-to-violence-ab_448728.html.
287. Adrien K. Wing & Peter P. Nadimi, Women's Rights in the Muslim World and the
Age of Obama, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PRons. 431, 453 (2011).
288. International Violence Against Women Act of 2010, S. 2982, 111th Cong. (2010).
289. Id.
290. International Violence Against Women Act of 2010, H.R. 4594, 111th Cong.
(2010).
291. Press Release, Office of Senator Tom Harkin, Members of House and Senate
Stand in Support of Landmark Legislation to Combat Violence Against Women (Feb. 4,
2010), available at http://www.harkin.senate.gov/press/release.cfm?i=322101.
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Senator Kerry echoed Rep. Delahunt's statement in his statement supporting the bill: "This bill will protect women everywhere, and it turns out
that championing these values is also an extremely effective and costefficient way to advance America's foreign assistance goals and
strengthen our national security." 2 9 2 Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-Maryland) also noted the strategic importance of the initiative in a statement
after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved I-VAWA: "The
Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that one of the most effective forces for defeating extremism is female safety and education. Violence against women undermines the effectiveness of existing U.S. investments in global
development and stability, whether fighting HIV/AIDS, increasing basic
"1293
education, or creating stability . . . .
Recently reintroduced to the 113th Congress by Rep. Janice Schakowsky (D-Illinois), I-VAWA awaits approval from the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs before it can be sent to the entire House for a vote.29 4
Congress should expand the current version of I-VAWA to include statutory protection for domestic violence asylum applicants to demonstrate
the United States' commitment to addressing what the original version of
I-VAWA deemed a "human rights problem of epidemic proportions." 2 9 5
C.

The Change: Proposed Amendment to the Immigration and
Nationality Act

Scholars note an important theme that shapes contemporary American
history: "concern for the beneficial impact of American policies on the
lives of vulnerable populations . . . ."'96 This theme revolves around
which obligations, if any, super power nations owe to ethical considerations.29 In the case of the United States in particular, the nation's strategic concerns have tended to align with policies aimed at aid for the
2 99
needy. 2 98 Scholars refer to this effect as "strategic humanitarianism."

292. Id.
293. Press Release, Office of Senator Benjamin Cardin, Cardin Hails Committee Passage of International Violence Against Women Act (Dec. 14,2010), available at http://www
.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/cardin-hails-committee-passage-of-internation
al-violence-against-women-act.
294. International Violence Against Women Act of 2013, H.R. 3571, 113th Cong.
(2013).
295. International Violence Against Women Act of 2007, S. 2279, 110th Cong. § 2(1)
(2007).
296. Mariano-Florentino Cudllar, The Limits of the Limits of Idealism: Rethinking
American Refugee Policy in an Insecure World, I HARv. L. & POL'Y Riv. 401, 416 (2007).
297. Id.
298. See id. at 417 ("[T]hough it is tempting to think of humanitarian policy as primarily a means of engaging in acts of charity for globally marginalized constituencies, history
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This particular foreign policy agenda focuses on over-arching goals of
international humanitarianism while attempting to limit the waste of both
American lives and capital on a global scale. 3 0 0 Humanitarian protection
through immigration law is inextricably linked to our foreign policy.30 1
As Sen. Kerry, Sen. Cardin, Rep. Delahunt, and other members of Congress point out, the promotion of women's rights internationally is the
most effective method for ensuring our national security and global
stability.
Because the well-being of refugees and displaced persons affects assumptions about what makes the world a stable and predictable place,
Congress should use I-VAWA to amend the definition of refugee found in
INA Section 101(a)(42)3 0 2 in the same manner that it did with IIRIRA 3 0 3
to address coercive family planning practices.
For example, the legislation could include language that establishes domestic violence victims as a particular social group in certain
circumstances:
For purposes of determination under this Act, a person who has been
subjected to severe domestic abuse at the hands of an intimate partner
which rises to the level of persecution, and who can show that the government in the country of origin is unable or unwilling to provide protection from the abuse because the abuse is tolerated within the society
or is viewed as a private matter beyond the jurisdiction of the laws of
that country, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of
their membership in a particularsocial group.
This expansion of the definition of refugee to include domestic violence
victims will eliminate the applicant's burden of "crafting a hyper-detailed
description of [a particular] social group that seems patently unrealistic
....

"304 The proposed definition also eliminates the applicant's burden

of proving the subjective intent of her abuser by using the causal connec-

has shown that American concern for the less fortunate around the planet can play an
important role in advancing the nation's strategic interests.").
299. Id.
300. See id. (identifying balancing that must occur in the face of any American international action).
301. See Carolyn Waller & Linda M. Hoffman, United States Immigration Law as a
Foreign Policy Tool: The Beijing Crisis and the United States Response, 3 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 313, 329 (1989) (listing the determinative factors used to decided if a refugee can be
considered a "special humanitarian concern" and including among those factors "the foreign policy consequences of finding the refugee(s) to be of special humanitarian concern").
302. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
303. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, tit. VI, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).
304. Heyman, supra note 76, at 149.
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tion between societal attitudes in the country of origin and government
inaction to establish the nexus requirement of an asylum claim. However, this definition still requires domestic violence asylum applicants to
meet the heavy burden of proving the other elements of an asylum
claim.30 s The applicant must prove that the abuse is severe enough to rise
to the level of persecution under current BIA precedent. 3 0 6 The applicant must also show that she has a subjective fear of future persecution
that is objectively reasonable.3 0 7
This proposed solution balances the national security interests related
to more lenient refugee protection with the humanitarian policies and
foreign policy goals of the country. This amendment also provides much
needed guidance to asylum adjudicators to end the inconsistent and inefficient adjudication of domestic violence asylum claims.
VI.

CONcLusION

In 1999, Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated,
"Violence against women is perhaps the most shameful human rights violation." 3 08 He added, "As long as it continues, we cannot claim to be
making real progress towards equality, development, and peace. "309 Unfortunately, more than a decade later, "women around the world continue to face human rights abuses" at alarming rates, "condoned in part
by deeply held patriarchal customs and religious practices, as well as insufficient resources and lack of political will." 310 In many countries, "cultural beliefs and norms . . . inadvertently legitimize, obscure, or deny

domestic violence." 31 ' As long as this trend continues, we will never
achieve global peace and security.

305. See Supplemental Brief, supra note 155, at 12 (acknowledging a victim would still
have other requirements to prove such as "the harm feared must be enough to constitute
persecution" and "the fear of future harm must be well-founded").
306. See In re O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 23, 26 (BIA 1998) (showing more than
"mere discrimination and harassment" is enough to meet the level of persecution under
the BIA).
307. See In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 225-26 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by In
re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987) (stating a well-founded fear of persecution
has to be more than "subjective or conjectural," but also based on "objective facts").
308. Press Release, United Nations, Violence Against Women 'Most Shameful,' Pervasive Human Rights Violation, Says Secretary-General in Remarks on International Women's Day (Mar. 8, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990308
.sgsm6919.html.
309. Id..
310. Wing & Nadimi, supra note 287, at 431.
311. Deanna Kwong, Recent Development, Removing Barriers for Battered Immigrant Women: A Comparison of Immigrant Protections Under VAWA I & II, 17 BERKELEY
WoMEN's L. J. 137, 140 (2002).
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The United States is in a critical position to make a lasting impact on
international women's rights issues, especially in the realm of domestic
violence.3 12 However, the U.S. asylum adjudication system lags behind
the international community in offering protection to the victims of domestic violence.31 3 U.S. asylum adjudicators have failed to expand refugee protection to domestic violence victims because "gender stereotypes
and misperceptions about [the nature of] domestic violence" pollute the
decision-making process.3 14 Current efforts to incorporate domestic violence into the existing definitional framework are innately flawed because
they require the victim to prove the intent of their abuser. 3 15 Congress
cannot continue to wait for case law to evolve to accommodate domestic
violence victims because the attitudes toward women and domestic violence that underlie the current decisions do not appear to be fading.3 16
Therefore, an alternative solution is necessary to achieve consistent,
straightforward results for domestic violence asylum applicants."
The United States must take a stand, to create an example for other
countries that any type of violence, especially those targeting women, regardless of the capacity of the attacker, is unacceptable.3 1 8 Women's
rights advocates agree that granting asylum to the victims of domestic
violence will send a clear message to foreign governments that they can
"no longer allow violence against women with impunity to continue." 31 9
"[Diomestic violence will continue to plague [the development of] societies throughout the world until state actors . .. reform their legal systems"

312. See

HUMAN

RIG-rrs

FIRST,

HOW

TO

REPAIR THE

U.S.

ASYLUM

SYSTEM:

BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 1 (2008), availableat http://www.humanrights

first.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/081204-ASY-asylum-blueprint.pdf ("The United States
has long been recognized as a beacon of hope and safety for the persecuted around the
world.").
313. See generally Danette G6mez, Note and Comment, Last in Line - The United
States Trails Behind in Recognizing Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 25 WIH1ITIER L. REV.

959 (2004) (comparing U.S. asylum policy to other countries).
314. Gillespie, supra note 69, at 150.
315. See Crystal Doyle, Note, Isn't "Persecution" Enough? Redefining the Refugee
Definition to Provide Greater Asylum Protection to Victims of Gender-Based Persecution,
15 WASH. & LEE.

J. CIVIL R-rs. & Soc. JusT. 519, 559 (2009) ("[N]one of [the imple-

mented] solutions [to integrate gender-based asylum claims] has been entirely satisfactory,
as even the best ones still require victims of gender-based persecution to prove the intent
of their attacker(s).").
316. See Gillespie, supra note 69, at 150 (identifying "gender stereotypes and misperceptions about domestic violence" as barriers to changes in judicial decision making
and calling for a statutory change to address the problem).
317. Doyle, supra note 315, at 520-21.
318. G6mez, supra note 313, at 986-87.
319. Musalo, supra note 13, at 119 (quoting Guatemalan women's rights attorney and
activist Hilda Morales Trujillo).
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to recognize the fundamental importance of women's rights. 3 2 0 The
United States must rise to this challenge and once again become the
world leader in protecting human rights by establishing a statutory protection for domestic violence asylum applicants. This step will not only
advance both the national security interest and humanitarian policies of
the United States, it will also send a clear message to the international
community that the United States will not tolerate domestic violence domestically or abroad.

320. Rebecca Adams, Violence Against Women and International Law: The Fundamental Right to State Protection from Domestic Violence, 20 N.Y. INT' L. Ri-v. 57, 128
(2007).
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